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THE SEAWORTHINESS TRILOGY:
CARRIAGE OF GOODS, INSURANCE, AND
PERSONAL INJURY
Nicolas R. Foster*
Marine insurance policies contain express' and implied2
warranties. The "warranty of seaworthiness" is an implied
warranty that serves to protect the insurer against prevent-
able losses. Seaworthiness is the "condition in which a ship
should be to enable her to counter whatever perils of the sea a
ship of her kind .. .may fairly be expected to encounter in
performing the voyage concerned."3 The warranty of seawor-
thiness has been called "unquestionably the most important
warranty of all."'
This article discusses the three most important aspects of
seaworthiness: (1) its role in shipping, as applied to hull and
cargo policies; (2) its relevance to personal injury suits; and
(3) its general implications for marine insurance in both these
areas. Part I of this article introduces the concept of seawor-
thiness, its history, and discusses why the United States
should adopt a uniform principle of seaworthiness. Part II
analyzes seaworthiness in more detail, providing definitions
and applications for various situations where the doctrine ap-
* J.D., University of Georgia; M.A., University of Virginia; B.A., College of
William and Mary. The author wishes to thank Thomas Schoenbaum for his
guidance.
1. An express warranty is "[an agreement expressed in a policy, whereby
the assured stipulates that certain facts relating to the risk are or shall be true,
or certain acts relating to the same subject have been or shall be done."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1588 (6th ed. 1990).
2. An implied warranty "[e]xists when the law derives it by implication or
inference from the nature of the transaction or the relative situation or circum-
stances of the parties." Id.
3. E.R. HARDY IVAMY, MARINE INSURANCE 317 (1974); see Maine Craft
Constrs., Ltd. v. Erland Blomqvist, Ltd., 1 Lloyd's List L. Rep. 514 (Q.B. 1953).
4. ALEX L. PARKS, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF MARINE INSURANCE AND
AVERAGE 257 (1987).
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plies. Parts III and IV address marine hull insurance policies
and claims for personal injuries, respectively. Finally, Part V
proposes that the United States adopt a uniform policy re-
garding seaworthiness because of the inconsistency and con-
fusion the current law creates.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Recognition of the Warranty of Seaworthiness in the
United States and the United Kingdom
Rather than simply analyze the evolution of seaworthi-
ness in U.S. courts alone, this article also evaluates the de-
velopment and current status of various aspects of the war-
ranty under British law. Supreme Court Justice Stanley F.
Reed once said, "a]s a matter of American judicial policy, we
tend to keep our marine insurance laws in harmony with
those of England."5 Although American marine insurance
practice is largely modeled after the British system, impor-
tant and instructive differences exist. By evaluating the di-
vergences and similarities between the evolution of the two
systems of law, a case will hopefully be made for uniformity
and consistency in this area.
The warranty of seaworthiness is "a creation of twentieth
century judicial policy concerning risk distribution in the
shipping industry and essentially depends on neither common
law tort nor contract concepts."6 The doctrine was first recog-
nized in the United States in 1902, with the case of The
Osceola.7 There, the U.S. Supreme Court announced a
shipowner's liability for a personal injury of a seaman caused
by the unseaworthiness of the vessel.' The Supreme Court
held that "the vessel and her owner are, both by English and
American law, liable to an indemnity for injuries received by
seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or
a failure to supply and keep in order the proper appliances
5. Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 325 (1955)
(Reed, J., dissenting).
6. Delome v. Union Barge Line Co., 444 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1971); see also
Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 321 F.2d 518 (6th Cir. 1963), affd, 379
U.S. 148 (1964).
7. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 148, 158 (1902).
8. See id.
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appurtenant to the ship."9
The Court defined the parameters of the seaworthiness
doctrine in subsequent cases. In Mitchell v. Trawler Racer,
Inc.,"° the Court held that a shipowner's duty was discharged
if the vessel and its equipment were "reasonably fit" for their
intended use, but also held that negligence is not a prerequi-
site to unseaworthiness." Further, the non-delegable nature
of the duty was enunciated in Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co.2
The Osceola and its progeny define seaworthiness as encom-
passing two elements: (1) the initial state in which a vessel
must be in to be considered seaworthy under the law, and (2)
a duty, under marine insurance policies or employer-
employee relations, to keep the vessel in that seaworthy
state.
Three years after The Osceola, the United Kingdom en-
acted its Marine Insurance Act ("MIA")," a national codifica-
tion of marine insurance principles. The United States has
yet to implement similar legislation. The MIA was primarily
the work of Sir MacKenzie Chalmers, who is said to have
"single-handedly" drafted the Act. 4 Rather than being an
avenue to create new law, the MIA was "an attempt to accu-
rately reflect the marine insurance law in the courts of the
United Kingdom, and elsewhere within the international
maritime community."" Despite early enthusiasm for an
American Marine Insurance Act, recent discussion focuses on
a Restatement of the Law of Marine Insurance. A Restate-
ment would provide guidance for attorneys and the courts,
thereby encouraging uniformity. 6 Proponents of this meas-
9. Id. at 175.
10. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960) (superseded by stat-
ute as stated in Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeiffer, 462 U.S. 523 (1983)).
11. See id. at 549-50.
12. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944) (superseded by statute
as stated in Davis v. Portline Transportes Maritime Internacional, 16 F.3d 532
(3d Cir. 1994)).
13. An Act to Codify the Law Relating to Marine Insurance, 1906, 6 Edw. 7,
ch. 41 (Eng.) [hereinafter Marine Insurance Act 19061.
14. See Patrick J.S. Griggs, Marine Insurance: Coverage, Warranties, Con-
cealment, Disclosure, Exclusions, Misrepresentations, and Bad Faith, 66 TUL. L.
REV. 423, 426 (1991).
15. Edward V. Cattell, Jr., An American Marine Insurance Act: An Idea
Whose Time Has Come, 20 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 1 (1997).
16. See Michael F. Sturley, Restating the Law of Marine Insurance: A Work-
able Solution to the Wilburn Boat Problem, 29 J. MAR. L. & COM. 41 (1998).
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ure generally claim that it would be more practical and easily
enacted than actual legislation.7 However, the push for a
uniform American Marine Insurance Act persists. The pro-
ponents of such an act stress the importance of a settled ma-
rine insurance law,18 the abolition of the controversial Su-
preme Court decision of Wilburn Boat v. Fireman's Fund, 8
and harmonization of American law with international stan-
dards.
B. Wilburn Boat
The issue of seaworthiness of a vessel is "solidly en-
trenched" in American federal maritime law, which is of great
importance to its development in American jurisprudence."
The meaning and importance of entrenched maritime law
was first enunciated in the case of Wilburn Boat v. Fireman's
Fund.' Wilburn Boat involved a houseboat on Lake Texoma
whose insurance policy contained express warranties against
change of ownership and against commercial use." After fire
destroyed the houseboat, the insurers discovered that the in-
sured had breached both of the express warranties. In re-
sponse to a claim made under the policy, the insurers argued
that the breaches voided the policy in its entirety, thereby re-
lieving them of liability. A choice of law issue emerged be-
tween the English tradition (often followed by American
courts), which called for exact compliance of warranties and
voidance of the policy for noncompliance, and Texas law,
where a breach of warranty does not void a policy unless the
breach caused the loss." Following English precedent, the
district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found
that the breaches of warranty automatically voided the ma-
17. See id. at 55.
18. See Cattell, supra note 15, at 4.
19. Wiburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund, 348 U.S. 310 (1955). Wilburn Boat
is the defining case in American insurance law. With Wilburn Boat, the Court
essentially made state law the dominating force in marine insurance. See id.
20. See Jefferson Marine Towing, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London,
472 So. 2d 146 (La. Ct. App. 1985); Aguirre v. Citizens Casualty Co., 441 F.2d
141 (5th Cir. 1971). But see Russel Pritchett, The Implied Warranty of Seawor-
thiness in Time Policies: the American View, 1984 LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q.
195 (1984).
21. Wilburn Boat, 348 U.S. at 310.
22. See id. at 311.
23. See id. at 312.
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rine insurance policy.24 These courts rejected the insured's
claim that Texas law applied and that the insurers were li-
able under the policy.25  However, the Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that state law applied to the interpretation of
the marine insurance contract.26
The Court, per Justice Black, found that state law ap-
plied in marine insurance cases where there was no judicially
established federal admiralty rule.27 With no established
American federal admiralty rule dictating the effect of
breaches of these warranties, Texas law applied and the in-
sured prevailed.28 Wilburn Boat was the genesis of the prin-
ciple that state marine insurance law could apply where fed-
eral common law previously dominated. Thereafter, lower
courts followed the "rule" that state law governed questions of
law in marine insurance in the absence of a "well entrenched"
applicable federal admiralty precedent.29
The fact that seaworthiness, like uberrima fidei"° and
prejudgment interest, has been deemed a solidly entrenched
maritime law is significant for several reasons. Most impor-
tantly, federal courts may define the parameters of well en-
trenched doctrines, and attempt to create uniformity within
them. This prevents state law from setting forth differing
definitions of seaworthiness. The policy behind the Wilburn
Boat decision was to keep intact those areas of admiralty law
24. See Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 201 F.2d 833 (5th Cir.
1953), rev'd, 348 U.S. 310 (1955).
25. See id.
26. See Wilburn Boat, 348 U.S. at 321.
27. See id. at 316.
28. See id.
29. See Bohemia, Inc. v. Homes Insurance Co., 725 F.2d 506, 510 (9th Cir.
1984). In Bohemia, the Ninth Circuit added its own "prong": a significant need
for uniformity may also suffice to justify application of general maritime law,
suggesting that uniformity may not always be desirable. See id.
30. Uberrima fides is defined as:
The most abundant good faith; absolute and perfect candor or openness
and honesty; the absence of any concealment or deception, however
slight. A phrase used to express the perfect good faith, concealing
nothing, with which a contract must be made; for example, in the case
of insurance, the insured must observe the most perfect good faith to-
ward the insurer .... Contracts of life insurance are said to be "uber-
rima fidae" when any material misrepresentation or concealment is fa-
tal to them.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1520 (6th ed. 1990). See also Thomas R. Beer, Com-
ment, Established Federal Admiralty Rules in Marine Insurance Contracts and
the Wilburn Boat Case, 1 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 149, 156 (1989).
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already developed in the courts, while leaving other areas to
development in state law. However, both state law and dis-
senting federal law have created fissures within the seawor-
thiness doctrine.31
II. DEFINING SEAWORTHINESS
A. Attributes and Evaluations of Seaworthiness Generally
Seaworthiness, as defined by both United States and
British law, is "that condition in which a ship should be to
enable her to counter whatever perils of the sea a ship of her
kind, and laden as she is, may fairly be expected to encounter
in performing the voyage concerned."3 The MIA states, with
equal ambiguity, that "a ship is deemed to be seaworthy when
she is reasonably fit in all respects to encounter the ordinary
perils of the seas of the adventure insured."3 Under the Car-
riage of Goods by Sea Act ("COGSA"),"4 "[neither the carrier
nor the ship shall be liable for loss or damage arising or re-
sulting from unseaworthiness unless caused by want of due
diligence on the part of the carrier to make the ship seawor-
thy. . . .,"" The lack of specific statutory definitions forces
courts to define seaworthiness on a case-by-case basis. At-
tempting to give substance to the definition of seaworthiness,
courts established: (1) the non-delegable and absoluteness of
the duty; (2) the requirements of seaworthiness in relation to
the vessel; (3) the need for evaluating seaworthiness based on
the time and place of use of the vessel; and (4) examples of
31. For example, despite the fact that seaworthiness has been held to be an
entrenched federal precedent, California codified it. See CAL. INS. CODE § 1920
(Deering 1997) ("In every marine insurance upon a ship or involving transporta-
tion by ship, a warranty is implied that the ship is seaworthy."). The code pro-
vides a definition of seaworthy: "[a] ship is seaworthy when reasonably fit to
perform the services and encounter the ordinary perils of the voyage contem-
plated by the parties to the policy." Id. § 1921. Other aspects of seaworthiness
are likewise codified. See id. § 1922 (compliance with warranty of seaworthi-
ness); id. § 1923 (extent of warranty of seaworthiness); and id. § 1924 (seawor-
thiness as to portions of voyage). See also CAL. HARB. & NAV. CODE § 863
(Deering 1997) (unseaworthy vessel); CAL. INS. CODE § 440 (kinds of warran-
ties).
32. IVAMY, supra note 3, at 317; Maine Craft Constructions, Ltd. v. Erland
Blomqvist, Ltd., 1 Lloyd's Rep 514 (Q.B. 1953).
33. Marine Insurance Act 1906, supra note 13, § 39(4).
34. 46 U.S.C.A. app. § 1304 (West 1975).
35. Id.
478 [Vol. 40
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unseaworthiness in specific circumstances.
"The duty to provide a seaworthy vessel is absolute and
non-delegable."36 It is no defense to the shipowner that a
third party, rather than the shipowner, brought about the
condition of unseaworthiness.37 If a shipowner breaches this
non-delegable duty to provide a seaworthy ship to transport
goods, the shipowner will not recover under the insurance
policy for a lost vessel or cargo. Where the unseaworthiness
causes a personal injury, the shipowner may be liable for such
injury.
The evaluation of seaworthiness in relation to the vessel
itself is threefold: sound ship, proper gear, and competent
crew.3" Each of these "contributes in a special way to provide
a vessel reasonably suitable for her intended service."39 The
warranty of seaworthiness guarantees that the ship itself is
staunch and sound, of sufficient equipment, construction, and
supplies; that she has a captain of competent skill and capac-
36. Sears, Roebuck & Co., v. American President Lines, Ltd., 345 F. Supp
395, 398 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
37. See Alaska S.S. Co. v. Patterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954); Blassingill v. Wa-
terman S.S. Corp., 336 F.2d 367 (9th Cir. 1964); Italia Societa Per Azioni Di
Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 310 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376
U.S. 315 (1964) (superseded by statute as stated in United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Plovidba, 683 F.2d 1022 (7th Cir. 1982)).
38. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Supreme Court, arguably in an effort
to guide lower courts, set forth certain conditions it deemed relevant to seawor-
thiness:
A carrier's first duty, and one that is implied by law, when he is en-
gaged in transporting goods by water, is to provide a seaworthy vessel,
tight and staunch, and well furnished with suitable tackle, sails, or mo-
tive power, as the case may be, and furniture necessary for the voyage.
She must also be provided with a crew, adequate in number and suffi-
cient and competent for the voyage, with reference to its length and
other particulars, and with a competent and skillful master, of sound
judgment and discretion; and, in general, especially in steamships and
vessels of the larger size, with some person of sufficient ability and ex-
perience to supply his place temporarily, at least, in case of his sickness
or physical disqualification. Owners must see to it that the master is
qualified for his situation, as they are, in general, in respect to goods
transported for hire, responsible for his act and negligence. He must
take care to stow and arrange the cargo, so that the different goods
may not be injured by each other, or by the motion of the vessel, or its
leakage; unless, by agreement, this duty is to be performed by persons
employed by the shipper.
The Propeller Niagara v. Cordes, 62 U.S. 7, 22 (1858).
39. Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 356 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1966),
rev'd, 386 U.S. 724 (1967) (quoting Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc. 362 U.S. 539,
550 (1960)).
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ity and a competent and sufficient crew; and generally that
she is, in every respect, fit for the voyage insured.0 Seawor-
thiness is therefore a highly fact-sensitive and situation-
specific inquiry, thereby making it a jury issue.4'
Seaworthiness is "a relative state and not necessarily an
absolute one,"42 often determined by how the vessel is used
and the place of its use. The question of seaworthiness is
therefore best viewed in light of the "usages of the port where
the vessel is fitted out, in reference to the destined voyage,'
the nature of the voyage itself,44 and the time of year of the
voyage.45 Unseaworthiness may occur when the unsafe condi-
tion is only temporary or transitory."6 Thus, a hazard may be
of short duration or recent vintage, yet nevertheless consti-
40. See Taylor v. Lowell, 3 Mass. 331 (1807); see also Heinrich C. Horn v.
CIA de Navegacion Fruco S.A., 404 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1968); Sanford & Brooks
Co. v. Columbia Dredging Co., 177 F. 878 (4th Cir. 1910) (defining seaworthi-
ness as "that condition of a vessel which enables it to avoid exposure of the
cargo to the perils of the sea. It must be sufficiently tight, staunch, and strong
to resist the ordinary attacks of winds and seas."); Texaco Inc. v. Universal Ma-
rine, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 311 (E.D. La. 1975); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. The Motor-
ship Marilyn L., 331 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Va. 1971); Mathis v. Hanover Ins. Co.,
192 S.E.2d 510 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972) (stating that the vessel must have adequate
stores and sound machinery, and have properly supplied fuel); Bouillon v. Lup-
ton, 143 Eng. Rep. 726, 730 (1863).
41. The following jury instruction has been used at trial: "If an unsafe con-
dition existed on the vessel and if, in your opinion, such unsafe condition consti-
tuted unseaworthiness, no matter for how short a time, and if that unseawor-
thiness was created or did come into. . . ." Silver v. American Export
Isbrandtsen Lines, 310 F. Supp. 681, 686 (E.D. Va. 1970); Venable v. A/S Det
Forenede Dampskibsselskab, 275 F. Supp. 591 (E.D. Va. 1967). California's In-
surance Code provides the following jury instruction:
You are instructed that the warranty of seaworthiness imports that the
ship is staunch and sound, of sufficient materials and construction,
with sufficient equipment, stores, and supplies and that she has a cap-
tain of competent skill and capacity and a competent and sufficient
crew, and is generally in every respect fit for the voyage insured.
CAL. INS. CODE § 1920 (Deering 1997).
42. PARKS, supra note 4, at 258; see also Lemar Towing Co. v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., 352 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. La. 1972), affd, 471 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.
1973); Smith v. Northwestern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 159 N.E. 87 (N.Y. 1927).
43. Hazard's Adm'r v. New Eng. Marine Ins. Co., 33 U.S. 557 (1834).
44. See Wilmering v. Lexington Ins. Co., 678 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. Ct. App.
1984).
45. See Keith v. Buchanan, 220 Cal. Rptr. 392 (Ct. App. 1985).
46. See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc. 362 U.S. 539 (1960) (superseded by
statute as stated in Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeiffer, 462 U.S. 523
(1983)); Joyce v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 651 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1981); Dos San-
tos v. Ajax Navigation Corp., 532 So. 2d 231 (Fl. App. 1988).
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tute unseaworthiness.4" The absence of crucial equipment,
such as adequate safety equipment, may also constitute un-
seaworthiness."
There are many breach of warranty of seaworthiness
cases that consider what constitutes a "seaworthy condi-
tion."49 For example, courts have found vessels unseaworthy
based on the following types of "defects": slippery decks,"0 a
heavy load;5" a defective hull; defective or damaged equipment
or appliances (e.g., engines, generators, pumps, pipes);52 fail-
47. See Shenker v. United States, 322 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1963); Puddu v.
Royal Neth. S.S. Co., 303 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1962).
48. See White v. Rimrock Tidelands, Inc., 414 F.2d 1336 (5th Cir. 1969);
Moore v. O/S Fram, 226 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
49. See, e.g., The Malcolm Baxter, Jr., 277 U.S. 323 (1928) (leaks constitute
unseaworthiness); Calo v. Ocean Ships, 57 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 1995) (excessively
warm temperature in the engine room could constitute unseaworthiness);
Mitchell v. FN Janice, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 565 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 1994) (an
open hatch, without more, does not constitute unseaworthiness); Cheek v. Wil-
liams-McWilliams Co., 697 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1983) (mere existence of film re-
sulting from misting through pump operation under windy conditions did not
necessarily constitute unseaworthiness); Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners
Corp., 540 F.2d 757 (4th Cir. 1976) (condition of ship beams constituted unsea-
worthiness); Bernardini v. Rederi A/B Saturnus, 512 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1975)
(slippery deck constitutes unseaworthiness); Shephard v. S.S. Nopal Progress,
497 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1974) (overcrowded and foggy refrigerated hold as un-
seaworthy); Carret v. Enso Gutzeit O/Y, 491 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1973) (defective
cargo bands constitute unseaworthy condition); Parker v. S.S. Dorothe Olen-
dorff, 483 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1973) (defective wiring would constitute unseawor-
thiness); Swords v. American Sealanes Inc., 443 F.2d 1324 (4th Cir. 1971) (de-
fective cargo hook); White v. Rimrock Tidelands, Inc., 414 F.2d 1336 (5th Cir.
1969) (lack of adequate safety equipment aboard a vessel may constitute un-
seaworthiness); U.S. v. MIV Marilena P, 433 F.2d 164 (4th Cir. 1969) (machin-
ery damage); Dugas v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 378 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1967);
American Ins. Co. v. Keane, 233 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (defective compass
may constitute unseaworthiness); Manhat v. U.S., 220 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1955)
(absence of hatch covers in the 'tween deck of the ship); Mitsubishi Shoji Kai-
sha, Ltd. v. Societe Purfina Maritime, 133 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1942) (vessel's en-
gine valves in need of grinding); In re Complaint of Tecomar S.A., 765 F. Supp.
1150 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (crack in ship's hull and defect in steering gear and defects
in ship's seawater cooling system); Cantiere Meccanico Brindisino v. Janson, 3
K.B. 452 (C.A. 1912); Clapham v. Langton, 122 Eng. Rep. 1001 (K.B. 1864);
Burges v. Wickham 122 Eng. Rep. 251(Q.B. 1863).
50. See Rice v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., 484 F.2d 1318 (2d Cir. 1973)
(holding that unseaworthiness exists only when the oil or grease creates such a
condition of slipperiness that the deck or stairway is no longer reasonably fit for
its intended use by the crew).
51. See Carvalho v. Andrea C., 880 F.2d 416 (9th Cir. 1990).
52. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946) (holding that no
warranty attaches to an appurtenance that could not be used as part of the ves-
sel's operation); Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Life Ins. Corp. of India, 526 F.2d 830 (2d
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ure of navigational equipment (but not failure to maintain
radar);53 obstructions on deck;54 defective hatches;" and the
possibility of arrest.56
B. Unseaworthiness Versus Negligence
The difference between negligence and unseaworthiness
is an important conceptual distinction. This distinction be-
comes even more significant when discussing injuries to sea-
men. 5 7  "Unseaworthiness is a condition. The manner in
which that condition arises, whether by negligence or other-
wise, is irrelevant to the owner's liability for personal injury
or damage . . . ."" The two elements are conceptually inde-
pendent. 9 Negligence is the basis of tort actions, whereas the
seaworthiness warranty is generally associated with contract
liability. ° The seaworthiness issue is therefore treated like a
Cir. 1975) (failure to produce shaft alignment readings); Atlantic Banana Co. v.
MIV Calanca, 342 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (one of three electrical genera-
tors shut down); Karobi Lumber Co. v. S.S. Norco, 249 F. Supp. 324 (S.D. Ala.
1966) (operation with only two boilers).
53. See Havens v. F/T Polar Mist, 996 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1993); American
Smelting v. Irish Spruce, 548 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1977); Aakre, 122 F.2d 469 (2d
Cir. 1941) (use of old charts did not constitute unseaworthiness); California &
Hawaiian Sugar Corp. v. Columbia S.S. Co., 391 F. Supp. 894 (E.D. La. 1972)
(sailing directions not readily available); The Temple Bar, 45 F. Supp. 608 (D.
Md. 1942) (failure to maintain charts not necessarily unseaworthiness); The
Heddernheim, 39 F. Supp. 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (use of chart on a scale of
1/200,000 instead of 1/100,000 did not constitute unseaworthiness). With re-
spect to radar, Professor William Tetley notes that, "it would appear that a ship
still does not need Loran or radar in order to be considered seaworthy, although
in many jurisdictions, particularly canals and inland waterways, such equip-
ment is compulsory." WILLIAM TETLEY, MARINE CARGO CLAIMs 384 (3d ed.
1988).
54. See Billedeaux v. Tidex, Inc., Civ. A. No. 91-134, 1993 WL 21420, at *1
(E.D. La. 1993), affd, 3 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision).
55. See New York Merchandise Co., Inc. v. Liberty Shipping Corp., 509 F.2d
1249 (9th Cir. 1975) (defective vent closing devices); J. Gerber & Co. v. S.S. Sa-
bine Howaldt, 437 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1971) (failure to cover hatches with tarpau-
lins not unseaworthiness); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. American President Lines,
345 F. Supp. 395 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (hole in coamings of the hatches).
56. See Morrisey v. S.S.A. & J. Faith, 252 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
57. See infra Part IV.A.
58. Beer, supra note 30, at 159; see also Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas
Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 498 (1971).
59. See Venable v. A/S Det Forenede Dampskibsselskab, 399 F.2d 347 (4th
Cir. 1968); Armstrong v. Chambers & Kennedy, 340 F. Supp. 1220 (S.D. Tex.
1972) (holding a shipowner liable for unseaworthiness as a concept wholly apart
from negligence or due care concepts).
60. See Italia Societa Per Azioni Di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co.,
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breach of warranty rather than the narrower duty-breach in-
quiry for negligence.61 In fact, if there is a condition consti-
tuting unseaworthiness, the carrier's care, or lack of it, does
not insulate him from liability.62
C. Seaworthiness as it Pertains to the Vessel's Crew
The concept of seaworthiness encompasses not only the
vessel and its gear, but also its crew.63 A vessel may be un-
seaworthy by virtue of an incompetent crew or individual
crewmembers. The following areas have been the subject of
unseaworthiness litigation with respect to the crew: opera-
tional negligence,64 insufficient crew,65 and injuries inflicted
by "lascivious crewmembers." The litigation in this area in-
volves two distinct problems: (1) dangerous crewmen who in-
flict personal injury, and (2) incompetent crewmen who,
through their negligence, cause damage to the vessel or cargo.
With respect to the latter, a seaman is not "reasonably fit for
the intended service of the ship," if he is not "equal in sea-
manship and disposition to men ordinarily employed as mer-
chant seamen."" This rule extends to shore-based employees
engaged in work "traditionally performed by seamen.'
310 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 315 (1964) (superseded by statute
as stated in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Plovidba, 683 F.2d 1022
(7th Cir. 1982)).
61. See Brister v. A.W.I., Inc., 946 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1991).
62. See Marshall v. Ove Skou Rederi A/S, 378 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1967).
63. See Lewis v. Pacific-Gulf Marine, Inc., 91 F.3d 121 (1st Cir. 1996) (un-
published table decision) (lack of adequate personnel or proper equipment could
constitute unseaworthiness); Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 515
(2d Cir. 1952) (warranty of seaworthiness breached if master or crew are not
competent for their duties); Lemar Towing Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 352
F. Supp. 652 (E.D. La. 1972), affd, 471 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1973).
64. See Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494 (1971).
65. See Thezan v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 708 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir.
1983) ("[Aln ... improperly manned vessel is considered unseaworthy as a mat-
ter of law .... ).
66. "A vessel bursting at the seams might well be a safer place than one
with a homicidal maniac as a crew member." Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co.,
348 U.S. 336, 340 (1955).
67. Foss v. Oliver J. Olson & Co., 58 Cal. Rptr. 511, 514 (Ct. App. 1967); see
also Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. app. § 688 (West 1975 & Supp. 1999); Pashby v.
Universal Dredging Corp., 608 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1979) ("A vessel may be un-
seaworthy because of 'defective' crew members. A seaman must be reasonable
fit; he must be equal in disposition to ordinary men of that profession").
68. Murphy v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 1246, 1249 (E.D.
Pa. 1970) ("[Tlhe warranty of seaworthiness [is not] limited to members of the
ship's crew, but is extended to shorebased employees who come within ambit of
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The warranty of seaworthiness does not require that the
seaman be competent to meet all contingencies, but merely
that he be "equal in disposition and seamanship to ordinary
men in the same calling."69 In Lemar Towing Co., Inc. v.
Fireman's Fund Insurance Company," for example, the court
held that the crew of a tug, and particularly its captain, was
incompetent at the commencement of the voyage, thus ren-
dering the tug unseaworthy at all subsequent times.71 Such
unseaworthiness resulted from the owner's failure to deter-
mine the qualification and competence of the crew before the
commencement of the voyage.72
In addition to the inadequacy of the crew's credentials,
"an unseaworthy condition may result from the [seamen's]
improper use of otherwise seaworthy equipment."" An unsafe
method of work may therefore constitute unseaworthiness,
even though the crew is otherwise competent and the equip-
ment seaworthy.74 Thus, unseaworthiness can result from an
adequate and competent crew performing work in an unsafe
manner, or an inadequate crew performing tasks in a safe
and prudent manner."
With respect to seamen's brawls, an owner may be liable
its humanitarian policy because, when aboard, they engaged in work tradition-
ally performed by seamen.").
69. The Roberta, 58 Lloyd's List L. Rep. 159 (1937); see also Horn v. Cia de
Navagacion Fruco, 404 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1968); International Packers London,
Ltd. v. Ocean S.S. Co. Ltd, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 218 (Q.B. 1955).
70. Lemar Towing Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. 352 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. La.
1972), affd, 471 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1973).
71. See id. at 665.
72. See id. at 652.
73. Rogers v. Eagle Offshore Drilling Servs., Inc., 764 F.2d 300, 303 (5th
Cir. 1985).
74. See Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores v. Ellerman Lines Ltd., 382 U.S. 812
(1965); Rogers v. Eagle Offshore Drilling Servs., Inc., 764 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.
1985); Adams v. Ugland Management Co., 515 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1975) (involving
improper method of berthing ship as constituting unseaworthiness); Kyzar v.
Vale Do Ri Doce Navegacai, S.A., 464 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1972) (involving failure
to provide hard hat and tag lines); Smith v. Olsen & Ugelstad, 459 F.2d 915 (6th
Cir. 1972) (holding that an unsafe procedure prescribed for unloading cargo may
result in a condition of unseaworthiness); Duncan v. Transeastern Shipping
Corp., 413 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that repeated mishandling of
buckets in a negligent manner constituted an unseaworthy condition); American
Mail Line v. United States, 377 F. Supp. 657 (W.D. Wash. 1974) (holding that
carrier's lack of standardized procedures for ballasting deep tanks constituted
unseaworthiness).
75. See Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 386 U.S. 724 (1967); Ori-
ent Mid-East Lines, Inc. v. A Shipment of Rice, 496 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1974).
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even though he did not have actual knowledge of the "incom-
petency or vicious proclivities" of crew members."6 An attack,
brawl, fight, or other disorderly conduct constitutes action-
able unseaworthiness if the act is of such an aggravated
character that it constitutes circumstantial evidence that
during the time leading up to the assault the ship was in an
unseaworthy condition because of the presence of such an in-
dividual." However, the warranty "does not mean that the
shipowner is liable for injuries resulting from every sailors
brawl."78 Whether a shipowner is held liable is a question of
degree and common sense. As Judge Learned Hand stated in
Jones v. Lykes Brothers Steamship Co. :
All men are to some degree irascible; every workman is
apt to be angry when a fellow complains of his work to
their common superior; and some will harbor their re-
sentment and provoke a quarrel over it even after the
lapse of several hours. Sailors lead a rough life and are
more apt to use their fists than office employees; what will
seem to sedentary and protected persons an insufficient
provocation for a personal encounter, is not the measure of
"disposition" of "the ordinary men in the calling." °
Thus, courts must take into consideration the nature of
the seamen's profession when determining whether disor-
derly conduct amounts to unseaworthiness.
III. MARINE HULL POLICIES
Seaworthiness is probably most significant in terms of
hull insurance.8 There is a warranty of seaworthiness in
every policy of marine hull insurance unless expressly
waived.82 In fact, the basis for the seaworthiness doctrine is
76. See Kenn v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1952); see
also E.L. Kellett, Annotation, Liability under Jones Act or Seaworthiness Doc-
trine for Injuries Caused by Assault, 22 A.L.R.3D 624 § 9 (1968).
77. See Harbin v. Interlake S.S. Co., 570 F.2d 99, 103 (6th Cir. 1978).
78. Foss v. Oliver J. Olsen & Co., 58 Cal. Rptr. 511, 515 (Ct. App. 1967)
(citing Boudoin v. Lykes Brothers S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336, 338-39 (1954)).
79. Jones v. Lykes Brothers S.S. Co., 204 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1953).
80. Id. at 817.
81. The concept of seaworthiness with regard to insurance policies provokes
some confusion, but authorities agree that the term is defined according to the
situation of the ship. See Graydon S. Staring & George L. Waddell, Marine In-
surance, 5 TUL. L. REV. 1619, 1638-39 (1999).
82. L & L Marine Serv., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 479 U.S. 1065
(1987); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Board of Comm'rs, 733 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir.
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marine hull insurance. As the court in Mathis v. Hanover
Insurance Co. explained, "the warranty and all its ramifica-
tions was developed for the peculiar circumstances of single-
voyage insurance for cargo ships and the warranty was of
utmost importance since it was not economically feasible for
the insurers to inspect the vessels involved in each transac-
tion.,14 The warranty therefore became a "useful tool in de-
termining liability for otherwise unexplainable losses on the
high seas."85
A. Duty to Disclose when Obtaining Hull Policy
Seaworthiness, for purposes of hull insurance, becomes
an issue when a vessel is lost or damaged and the insurer at-
tempts to avoid liability on an insurance policy on the
grounds that the shipowner breached the implied warranty of
seaworthiness. The warranty implied in an insurance policy
is a continuing obligation that the owner will not, from bad
faith or neglect, knowingly permit a vessel to break ground in
an unseaworthy condition." The duty of utmost good faith, or
uberrima fidei, requires that the insured disclose to the in-
surer any information material to the risk involved (e.g.,
transport of dangerous cargo, etc.)." Uberrima fidei, an en-
1984); Neubros Corp. v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 359 F. Supp. 310 (E.D.N.Y.
1972); see also discussion infra Part III.C.
83. Furthermore, the warranty is commercial in nature, and does not apply
to pleasure craft. See generally Mathis v. Hanover Ins. Co. 192 S.E.2d 510, 512
(Ga. Ct. App. 1972) ("We do not believe the warranty of seaworthiness under
traditional maritime law can be read into an 'All Risks Yacht Policy' in which
use of the vessel is restricted to private pleasure."); Johnson Bros. Boat Works
v. Conrad, 156 A.2d 175 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1959) (holding that a con-
tinuing warranty of seaworthiness as applied to a small pleasure craft insured
under a liability policy, if it exists, would be contractual in character and should
satisfy the essential requisites of a contract, and where the minds of the parties
do not meet, there is no contractual basis for the continuing warranty).
84. Mathis, 192 S.E.2d at 512.
85. Id.
86. See Insurance Co. of N. Am., 733 F.2d at 1161.
87. See Sun Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ocean Ins. Co., 107 U.S. 485 (1883). But see
Windsor Mount Joy Mut. Ins. Co. v. Giragosian, 57 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 1995)
(holding that insured did not breach warranty of seaworthiness in marine in-
surance policy under doctrine of uberrima fidei by failing to hire marine me-
chanic to ascertain vessel's seaworthiness before setting sail, even though Coast
Guard had recently pumped boat out); Myers v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 759 F.2d
1542 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that mortgagee loss payee had no duty to report
grounding of vessel and keel damage prior to inception of maritime hull policy
and, hence, policy was not voided). See generally supra note 30.
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trenched federal precedent," also dictates voiding the marine
contract if the facts that the insured fails to disclose are ma-
terial and the insurer relied on those facts in agreeing to is-
sue the policy. 9 The Court first incorporated uberrima fidei
into the general admiralty law in M'Lanahan v. Universal In-
surance Co.9" in 1828. The Court held in a subsequent case
that the duty of utmost good faith with respect to marine in-
surance imposed a strict burden of disclosure on the insured.
The insured" is therefore under a duty to disclose any known
defect constituting unseaworthiness. If the insured fails to
disclose material facts, recovery under the policy is barred.
B. Presumptions
Presumptions play an important role in determining the
burden of proof in marine insurance litigation cases involving
loss of cargo or damage to the vessel when seaworthiness is
an issue. A vessel is generally presumed seaworthy. 4
Therefore, an insurer attempting to defeat the insured's claim
by alleging unseaworthiness of the vessel bears the burden of
proof.9"
However, if there is no readily apparent cause (like heavy
88. See Beer, supra note 30, at 156.
89. See Puritan Ins. Co. v. Eagle S.S. Co. S.A., 779 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1985);
see generally Thomas Schoenbaum, The Duty of Utmost Good Faith in Marine
Insurance Law: A Comparative Analysis of American and English Law, 29 J.
MAR. L. & CoM. 1 (1998).
90. M'Lanahan v. Universal Ins. Co., 26 U.S. 170 (1828).
91. See Sun Mut. Ins. Co., 107 U.S. at 485.
92. A vessel became a third-party beneficiary of the cargo policy by virtue of
the insurer's waiver of subrogation rights against the vessel, thus any breach of
good faith by the demise charter could not be imputed to it. See, e.g., Durant &
Russel, Inc. v. Dillingham Tug & Barge Corp., 895 F.2d 507, 511 (9th Cir. 1989).
93. See generally Geoffrey Brice, Unexplained Losses in Marine Insurance,
16 MAR. LAW. 105 (1991).
94. See Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Holcombe, 223 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1955); J.
Aron & Co. v. Dampskibs Selsk Dannebrog, 290 F. 733 (2d Cir. 1923); Great
American Ins. Co. v. Bureau Veritas, 338 F. Supp. 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd,
478 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1973); Boston Iron & Metal Co. v. Automobile Ins. Co., 145
A. 501 (Ind. 1929); Snethen v. Memphis Ins. Co., 3 La. Ann. 474 (1848); Perry v.
Cobb, 34 A. 278 (Me. 1896); Fisch v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 130 A.2d 891 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957).
95. See, e.g., Granger v. Providence-Washington Ins. Co., 200 F. 730 (2d.
Cir. 1912); Antoine v. Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc., 249 F. Supp. 290, 291
(W.D. La 1965); Massey S.S. Co. v. Importers & Exporters Ins. Co., 189 N.W.
415 (Minn. 1922); R.A. Houghton and Mancon Ltd. v. Sunderland Marine Mut.
Ins. Co. Ltd., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 60 (Q.B. 1988); Panamanian Oriental S.S. Corp. v.
Wright, 1 W.L.R. 882 (C.A. 1971).
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storms) for the damage to the vessel or cargo, the vessel is
presumed unseaworthy." The sinking or other damage is
then presumed caused, not by a "peril of the sea," which the
insurance contract ordinarily covers, but by the vessel's own
inherent unseaworthiness." This presumption is called "the
calm water presumption."98 The insured may, however, rebut
the presumption by establishing the vessel's seaworthiness
prior to the damage and the absence of conditions that would
render the vessel unseaworthy." If the insured provides no
evidence of seaworthiness, however, the claim will probably
fail. ' 00
Once the insured demonstrates seaworthiness, a counter
presumption then arises that "some extraordinary, although
unknown and unascertainable, perils of the sea" caused the
unexplained sinking and/or loss. '0 There must, in that case,
be some reasonable possibility that some "unseen peril"
caused the loss.' °2 If the insured meets this burden of reason-
96. See Boston Ins. Co. v. Dehydrating Process Co., 204 F.2d 441, 443 (1st
Cir. 1953); see also Federazione Italiana dei Corsorzi Agrari v. Mandask Com-
pania De Vapores, 388 F.2d 434, 436 (2d Cir. 1968) ("Under these circumstances
[i.e. when the loss of a ship is unexplained], it is presumed that the loss was oc-
casioned by the unseaworthiness of the [ship]."); Eastern Transp. Co. v. Insley,
51 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1931); Derby Co. v. A.L. Mechling Barge Lines, Inc., 258 F.
Supp. 206, 211 (E.D. La. 1966) ("[A] vessel... is presumed to be unseaworthy
when she sinks under normal conditions and in the absence of proof that she
was improperly handled."); Ohio River Co. v. M/V Irene Chotin, 238 F. Supp.
114, 118-19 (E.D. La. 1965) ("The law is well settled ... that when a vessel
sinks under normal conditions, and absent sufficient proof that improper han-
dling caused the sinking, the vessel is presumed to have been unseaworthy.");
Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Long, 77 S.E.2d 457 (Va. 1953).
97. See Pace v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 838 F.2d 572, 572 (1st Cir. 1988).
98. Jefferson Marine Towing, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 472
So. 2d 146, 151 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (quoting Boston Ins. Co., 204 F.2d at 443).
99. See Boston Ins. Co., 204 F.2d at 443 (cited with approval in Pace, 838
F.2d at 577); see also Darien Bank v. Travelers Indem. Co., 654 F.2d 1015, 1021
(5th Cir. 1981); Wilmering v. Lexington Ins. Co., 678 S.W.2d 865, 870 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984). In Jefferson Marine Towing, 472 So. 2d at 146, the owner of the
vessel, by proving that the vessel was seaworthy before it sank, successfully re-
butted the "calm water" presumption of maritime law that vessel was unsea-
worthy. See id.
100. See Brice, supra note 93, at 108.
101. Boston Ins. Co., 204 F.2d at 443; see also Darien Bank, 654 F.2d at 1021;
Reisman v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 312 F.2d 17, 20 (5th Cir. 1963); Tropi-
cal Marine Prods., Inc. v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. of Pa., 247 F.2d 116 (5th
Cir. 1957).
102. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Lanasa Shrimp Co., 726 F.2d 688, 689
(11th Cir. 1984).
In case of unexplained sinking of a vessel insured under a commercial
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able probability, then the insurer has the burden of showing
that the vessel was unseaworthy in some respect.' The in-
surer's burden also requires a showing that the shipowner
knew of the unseaworthy condition.0 For example, mainte-
nance of class is not conclusive evidence of seaworthiness."'
Furthermore, a ship is not unseaworthy ipso facto if its condi-
tion violates a statute, but violation of a statute may provide
guidance as to whether an unseaworthy condition existed.' 6
However, where a ship violates a statutory rule of navigation
intended to prevent collisions, the burden rests on the
shipowner to show that the vessel could not have caused the
loss.0 7
C. Waiver
The implied warranty of seaworthiness can be waived, or
superseded by the effect of coverage provisions in the policy or
hull marine policy, the insured cannot recover on mere proof of sinking
in calm seas, because it is presumed that the vessel was unseaworthy
when she left port, although the presumption may be rebutted and if
insured proves that the vessel left port in a seaworthy condition a coun-
ter presumption arises that the sinking and loss was caused by some
extraordinary peril of the sea and insurer then has ultimate burden of
proving unseaworthiness.
Id.; see also Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Aetna Gas. & Sur. Co., 990 F.2d 865 (6th Cir.
1993); Mathis v. Hanover Ins. Co., 192 S.E.2d 510 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972); Inland
Rivers Serv. Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 418 N.E.2d 1381, 1382-83 (Ohio
1981).
103. See Texaco, Inc v. Universal Marine, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 311, 312-13
(E.D. La. 1975) (holding that insurer "has the burden of proving that the
shipowner ... acted out of bad faith or neglect by knowingly permitting the
[vessel] to sail in an unseaworthy condition"); Jefferson Marine Towing, 472 So.
2d at 146 (holding that underwriters of maritime policy, who presented no wit-
nesses with knowledge of sinking of insured vessel, failed to meet burden of es-
tablishing breach of implied or express warranties of seaworthiness was proxi-
mate cause of loss).
104. See Foster v. Reliance Ins. Co., 487 So. 2d 192, 194 (La. Ct. App. 1986)
("An insurer bears the burden of proving that a vessel is unseaworthy, and this
burden requires a showing that the shipowner had knowledge of the condition");
Jefferson Marine Towing, 472 So. 2d at 150.
105. See Griggs, supra note 14, at 439.
106. See Harris v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 493 P.2d 861, 863-64 (Cal. 1972)
(holding that absent a statute or regulation requiring a yacht to be equipped
with a two-way radio, failure of insured to have an operable radio transmitter
aboard his yacht did not render the yacht unseaworthy in breach of the implied
warranty of seaworthiness); Warren v. Manufacturers Ins. Co., 30 Mass. 518
(1833).
107. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. New Orleans, 733 F.2d 1161, 1165 (5th
Cir. 1984).
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by other circumstances evincing an intent to waive.'0 8 Also,
equitable considerations may justify judicial waiver of the
warranty. °9 In determining the effectiveness and validity of a
waiver clause, courts evaluate whether the language of the
waiver provision unambiguously covers risks ordinarily ex-
cluded by a breach of the implied warranty of seaworthi-
ness."0 If the clause does cover such risks, then it presuma-
bly underwrites that particular type of unseaworthiness."'
Clauses that clearly communicate the particular risks in-
volved will generally be upheld."2
As with any warranty, the insurer may waive the war-
ranty of seaworthiness. If a defect leads to an unseaworthy
condition, and the insurer knows of this defect-through its
agent or otherwise-the insurer may be deemed to have
waived any available warranty claims."3 This situation most
likely comes into play when the insurer takes an active part
in the supervision and inspection of the vessel. The burden,
however, is on the insured, as he cannot simply rely on patent
defects to justify a waiver."4 The key inquiry in an insurer's
purported waiver is the actual or constructive knowledge, not
108. See IVAMY, supra note 32, at 331-34. See, e.g., Reliance Ins. Co. v. Esca-
pade, 280 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1960); Provincial Ins. Co. of Canada v. Leduc [1874]
L.R.-P.C. 244; Weir v. Aberdeen, 106 Eng. Rep. 383 (1819); P. Samuel & Co. v.
Dumas, 13 Lloyd's List L. Rep. 503 (C.A. 1922); Daneau v. Laurent Gendron
[1964] 1 Lloyd's List L. Rep. 220. See also Capital Coastal Corp. v. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co., 378 F. Supp. 163 (E.D. Va. 1974) (underwriters did not waive war-
ranty that certain captain would be employed on the injured tug).
109. See Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 978 F.2d
1422 (5th Cir. 1993).
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See A. Kemp Fisheries, Inc. v. Castle & Cooke, Inc., 852 F.2d 493, 497-
98 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that contract clauses clearly and unequivocally com-
municate that the risk of unseaworthiness would fall on [insured] once it ac-
cepted the vessel. "Similar disclaimers have been found to be clear and une-
quivocal and have been enforced in admiralty."); McAllister Lighterage Line,
Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 244 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1957).
113. See Dant & Russell, Inc. v. Dillingham Tug & Barge Corp., 877 F.2d
1404, 1407 (9th Cir. 1989), amended, reh'g denied, 895 F.2d (9th Cir. 1990).
Knowledge of a defect amounting to unseaworthiness may not, however, bar a
charterer's right to rely on the owner's implied warranty of seaworthiness. See
Neubros Corp. v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 359 F. Supp. 310, 315 (E.D.N.Y.
1972) (citing Church Cooperage Co. v. Pinkney, 170 F. 266 (2d Cir. 1909)).
114. See Neubros Corp., 359 F. Supp. at 317 (holding that Inchmaree clause
covering loss caused from latent defects did not vitiate warranty of seaworthi-
ness where insured had an affirmative duty to reveal patent defects to under-
writers).
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the obviousness of the defect.
D. Voyage Policies
A hull policy insures the vessel for a particular voyage
("voyage policy"), or for a period of time ("time policy").115 Dif-
ferences have arisen as to the existence and extent of the
warranty of seaworthiness in either policy. An implied war-
ranty of seaworthiness applies to voyage policies and is im-
plied at the commencement of the risk. The seaworthiness
warranty in a voyage policy is absolute in nature and inde-
pendent of any knowledge or fault on the part of the in-
sured."6 It is also not dependent on whether the subsequent
loss is directly attributable to the lack of seaworthiness."'
Liability results if the defective condition existed when the
policy was issued."8
Under both U.S. and British insurance law, the warranty
applies to "every voyage policy, no matter what the interest,
whether it is the ship itself, or the cargo carried in it, or the
freight.""9 The MIA states that:
(1) In a voyage policy there is an implied warranty that at
the commencement of the voyage the ship shall be seawor-
thy for the purpose of the particular adventure insured.
(2) Where the policy attaches while the ship is in port,
there is also an implied warranty that she shall, at the
commencement of the risk, be reasonably fit to encounter
• • 120
the ordinary perils of the port.
115. A voyage policy is an insurance policy covering a voyage charter, in
which the ship is engaged to carry full cargo on a specific voyage, and the ship is
manned, controlled and navigated by the owner. See Employers Ins. of Wausau
v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 978 F.2d 1422, 1425 n.5 (5th Cir. 1993).
116. See id. at 1431; PARKS, supra note 4, at 258.
117. See PARKS, supra note 4, at 258.
118. See Johnson Bros. Boat Works v. Conrad, 156 A.2d 175, 179 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1959).
119. R.J. LAMBETH, TEMPLEMAN ON MARINE INSURANCE: ITS PRINCIPLES
AND PRACTICE 37 (1981). California's codification of this area provides as fol-
lows: "Where any portion of the voyage contemplated by a policy differs from
other portions in respect to the things requisite to make the ship seaworthy
therefor, a warranty of seaworthiness is complied with if, at the commencement
of each portion, the ship is seaworthy with reference to that portion." CAL. INS.
CODE § 1924 (Deering 1997).
120. However, the ship need only be seaworthy when she sails on her voyage,
and it is "immaterial whether she was seaworthy when she was lying in port."
See IVAMY, supra note 3, at 320. See, e.g., Parmeter v. Cousins, 170 Eng. Rep.
1141 (1809).
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(3) Where the policy relates to a voyage which is per-
formed in different stages, during which the ship requires
different kinds of or further preparation or equipment,
there is an implied warranty that at the commencement of
each stage the ship is seaworthy in respect of such prepa-
ration or equipment for the purposes of that stage.1 1
In a voyage policy, under either U.S. or British law,
where the warranty is implied, the insured must comply ex-
actly with the policy. If the insured breaches the seaworthi-
ness warranty in any way, the insurer is discharged from li-
ability for injury suffered after the date of the breach of
warranty. 22 "If [the warranty] be not so complied with, then,
subject to any express provision in the policy, the insurer is
discharged from liability as from the date of the breach of
warranty, but without prejudice to liability incurred by him
before that date.' 2  The insurer therefore avoids liability for
losses incurred after the breach. 24 With respect to material-
ity, "the insurer is discharged regardless of whether or not
the warranty of seaworthiness was material to the risk, and
whether or not the failure to comply with the warranty of
seaworthiness caused or contributed to the loss. '25 The in-
sured therefore is denied coverage if the insurer proves any
unseaworthy condition, regardless of whether or not the con-
dition caused the covered loss.
126
121. Marine Insurance Act, supra note 13, § 39.
122. See Brice, supra note 93, at 111.
123. Marine Insurance Act, supra note 13, § 33(3).
124. Under British law, however, the insured can escape liability if he can
show the breach was excused pursuant to section 34(1) of the Marine Insurance
Act 1906. See id. §34(1).
125. Quebec Marine Ins. Co. v. Commercial Bank of Canada, 17 Eng. Rep. 1
(P.C. 1870). See generally Bank of Nova Scotia v. Hellenic Mut. War Risks
Ass'n, Ltd., 2 Lloyd's Rep. 191 (H.L. 1991):
We do not agree that the entry of a vessel into a [prohibited zone], even
though a breach of warranty under [Rule] 25C, has the effect automati-
cally and without more of bringing the contract of insurance to an end.
It entitles the insurer to treat the contract as at an end if he so chooses,
but the matter is one for his choice.
Id. at 201 (quoting Bank of Nova Scotia v. Hellenic Mut. War Risks Ass'n, Ltd.,
2 Lloyd's Rep. 238, 254 (C.A. 1989)).
126. See Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 978 F.2d
1422, 1432 (5th Cir. 1993).
If the implied warranty of seaworthiness in a voyage policy is
breached-that is, if the vessel is not in fact seaworthy at the begin-
ning of the voyage or at the inception of the risk-then no recovery can
be had on the policy. This result does not depend on the.., subsequent
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There is no requirement of affirmative fault on the part
of the shipowner in order to deny coverage. The shipowner's
negligence, either in terms of an innocent mistake or igno-
rance of the vessel's condition, prevents collection of the pol-
icy if the ship is deemed unseaworthy. 127 If a member of the
crew negligently renders the vessel unseaworthy prior to the
commencement of the voyage, the shipowner will not recover
under a voyage policy, regardless of privity.
Similar rules apply to a voyage made in multiple stages.
Each stage must be viewed independently in evaluating the
seaworthiness of that particular stage of the voyage. 29 In
Bouillon v. Lupton, ° for example, the court held that the
warranty had been complied with if different degrees of sea-
worthiness were necessary for the different stages of the voy-
age, and if at the commencement of each stage the vessels
were properly equipped for the particular stage."' In cases of
divisible voyages, the burden falls on the insured to prove the
necessity of dividing the voyage into stages once the insurer
demonstrates that the vessel was not seaworthy for the voy-
age from its outset.
13 2
loss being directly attributable to the lack of seaworthiness.
Id.; see also Richelieu & Ontario Nav. Co. v. Boston Marine Ins. Co., 136
U.S. 408, 429 (1890); Gregoire v. Underwriters at Lloyds, 559 F. Supp. 596,
598 (D. Alaska 1982); GRANT GILMORE & CHARLEs L. BLACK, THE LAW OF
ADMIRALTY § 2-6 (2d ed. 1975).
127. See LAMBETH, supra note 119, at 37.
128. See id.
129. See Eridania S.p.A. v. Oetker, 1 Lloyd's Rep. 307 (Q.B. Comm. Ct. 1999)
("[S]eaworthiness is not an absolute concept; it is relative to the nature of the
ship, to the particular voyage and even to the particular of stage of the voyage
on which the ship is engaged."); Liberian Ins. Agency v. Mosse, 2 Lloyd's Rep.
560 (Q.B. 1977) ("The vessel sailed on a stage of the voyage with insufficient
bunkers and to this extent was in breach of a warranty of seaworthiness."); A.E.
Reed & Co. v. Page, Son & East Ltd., 1 K.B. 743 (1927); see also Marine Insur-
ance Act 1906, supra note 13, § 39(3).
130. Bouillon v. Lupton, 143 Eng. Rep. 726 (1863).
131. See id. at 731.
132. See Quebec Marine Ins. Co. v. Commercial Bank of Canada, 17 Eng.
Rep. 1 (P.C. 1870); The Vortigern, 68 L.J.P. 49 (P. 1899) (holding that a vessel
which was not adequately provided with coal for each stage of the voyage was
unseaworthy); Northumbrian Shipping Co. Ltd. v. E. Timm & Son Ltd., 2 All
E.R. 648, 657 (H.L. 1939) ("[TIhe voyage may be divided into stages, and... it is
sufficient if she be satisfactorily equipped for each stage at its commence-
ment."); see also IVAMY, supra note 3, at 322-23.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
E. Time Policies
The American law regarding warranties of seaworthiness
in voyage policies is closely aligned to British law. However,
the same is not true for time policies. Like the harsh stan-
dards of both countries on voyage policies, the United States
maintains such standards for time polices whereas British
law does not.
1. British Law
Time policies cover a charter-party,'33 where the risk is
limited to a certain fixed term or period of time, rather than a
given voyage.' Under British law, there is no implied war-
ranty of seaworthiness in an ordinary time policy because the
vessel is usually already at sea. Thus, the owner is unable to
guarantee or control the vessel's condition.'35 As one commen-
tator noted over ninety years ago, "there is nothing to prevent
a time policy lapsing and a new one beginning when the ves-
sel is at sea, beyond the knowledge and control of her owner
or manager as respects unseaworthiness: that consequently
insistence on the warranty in such a case might become ineq-
uitable." 6 There is therefore, no implied warranty of seawor-
thiness in British time hull policies. 7 However, an exception,
grounded in equitable considerations, to the rule against im-
plied warranties of seaworthiness in British time policies
arises where the ship is sent to sea in an unseaworthy state
with the privity of the insured.'38 The insurer avoids liability,
133. A charter is a contract for the temporary rent or lease of a vessel.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 236 (6th ed. 1990).
134. A time-policy is "[a] policy of marine insurance in which the risk is lim-
ited, not to a given voyage, but to a certain fixed term or period of time." Id. at
1483.
135. See Marine Insurance Act 1906, supra note 13, § 39(5); LAMBETH, supra
note 119, at 41. For a survey of English case law refusing to find an implied
warranty of seaworthiness in a time policy, see PARKS, supra note 4, at 264,
265.
136. WILLIAM Gow, MARINE INSURANCE 272 (4th ed. 1909).
137. See Rosa v. Insurance Co. of Pa., 296 F. Supp. 167 (S.D. Cal. 1969) affd,
421 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1970). The MIA states: "in a time policy there is no im-
plied warranty that the ship shall be seaworthy at any stage of the adventure,
but where with the privity of the insured, the ship is sent to sea in an unsea-
worthy state, the insurer is not liable for any loss attributable." Marine Insur-
ance of Act 1906, supra note 13, § 39(5).
138. See PARKS, supra note 4, at 257; J.J. Lloyd Instruments Ltd. v. Northern
Star Ins. Co. Ltd., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 32 (C.A. 1986).
[Tihe Act provides that in a time policy (as distinct from a voyage pol-
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thereby sustaining a valid defense under MIA section 39(5), if
he shows that: (1) the ship was sent to sea"9 in an unseawor-
thy state (2) with the privity of the insured, 4 ° and (3) that the
whole loss or a certain part thereof was attributable to such
unseaworthiness.141
Privity arises in cases where the shipowner has positive
knowledge of, or when he turns a "blind eye" to, the unsea-
worthiness.'42 Lord Denning, who drew a clear distinction be-
tween negligence and "knowing neglect," gave privity the fol-
lowing interpretation:
To disentitle the shipowner, he must, I think, have knowl-
edge not only of the facts constituting the unseaworthi-
ness, but also knowledge that these facts rendered the
ship unseaworthy, that is not reasonably fit to encounter
the ordinary perils of the sea .... If a man suspicious of
the truth, turns a blind eye to it, and refrains from in-
quiry-so that he should not know it for certain-then he
is to be regarded as knowing the truth. This "turning a
blind eye" is far more blameworthy than mere negligence.
Negligence in not knowing the truth is not equivalent to
knowledge of it.
143
Privity alone will not, however, excuse the insurer. In
addition, the unseaworthiness to which the owner is privy
icy): "... there is no implied warranty that the ship shall be seaworthy
at any stage of the adventure, but where, with the privity of the as-
sured, the ship is send to sea in an unseaworthy state, the insurer is
not liable for any loss attributable to unseaworthiness."
Id.; Compania Maritima San Basilio S.A. v. The Oceanus Mut. Underwriting
Ass'n (Berm.) Ltd., 3 All E.R. 243 (Q.B. 1977).
139. In a U.S. case defining the meaning of the MIA's "sent to sea" language,
the court did not relieve insurers from liability for a loss that occurred when
railroad cars and insured goods rolled off a car float and into a river, where the
car float had not been "sent to sea" but was still moored at the time of the acci-
dent. See New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co. v. Gray, 240 F.2d 460 (2d
Cir. 1957).
140. See supra note 20; see also Compania Maritima San Basilio S.A., 3 All
E.R. at 243; G. Choen, Sons & Co. v. Standard Marine Ins., 20 Lloyd's List L.
Rep. 133 (1925); M. Thomas & Son Shipping Co. v. London & Provincial Marine,
29 L.T.R. 736 (1913). But see Willmott v. General Accident Fire & Life Assur-
ance Corp., Ltd., 55 Lloyd's List L. Rep. 156 (K.B. 1935); Frangos v. Sun Ins.
Office, 49 Lloyd's List L. Rep. 354 (1934); Thomas v. Tyne & Wear S.S. Freight
Ins. Ass'n, 1 K.B. 938 (1917).
141. See Griggs, supra note 14, at 440.
142. See LAMBETH, supra note 119, at 42, 437.
143. Compania Maritima San Basilio S.A., 3 All E.R. at 243.
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must be the proximate cause of the loss.'" Therefore, even if
the ship sunk with gaping holes in the hull, of which the
shipowner was aware, this will not relieve the insurer unless
those holes caused the vessel to sink. Consequently, where
there are two "unseaworthy characteristics," and the insured
is only privy to one, the insurer is only protected if the loss is
attributable to that particular unseaworthy characteristic
privy to the insured. 4 1 If the insured shows, through direct
evidence, that the vessel was fortuitously lost due to a peril of
the seas, the insured ordinarily recovers.4 6
Under English law, then, unseaworthiness is mostly ir-
relevant to claims made under time policies. Unseaworthi-
ness in a British time policy may still be relevant when a ship
vanishes without a trace and the ship is shown unseaworthy
when she left port, with the owner's knowledge of the unsea-
worthy condition, and that condition caused the damage.
147
2. United States Law
In the first half of the nineteenth century, American
courts expanded upon the British rule by asserting that the
insured must use proper care to maintain the seaworthiness
of the vessel throughout the insurance period and not just at
the commencement of the risk.4 1 Indeed, U.S. courts did not
make, and continue to ignore, any real distinction between
time and voyage policies in terms of the implied warranty of
seaworthiness.19  British precedents were summarily rejected
in favor of the newly crafted American Rule." Although re-
jected by some states, such as Illinois,"' the American Rule
144. See Rosa v. Insurance Co. of Pa., 296 F. Supp. 167 (S.D. Cal. 1969)
(holding that the owner's knowledge of the existing defects that caused the ves-
sel to be unseaworthy at outset of voyage did not preclude coverage where there
was no evidence that such defects were the proximate cause of the loss);
LAMBETH, supra note 119, at 42.
145. See Griggs, supra note 14, at 437.
146. See Brice, supra note 93, at 113.
147. See id. at 112.
148. See Dupeyre v. Western Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 2 Rob. 457 (La. 1842);
Barnewall v. Church, 1 Cai. R. 217 (N.Y. 1803).
149. See Rouse v. Insurance Co., 20 F. Cas. 1269, 1270 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1862)
(No. 12,089) (finding there is "an implied warranty of seaworthiness in time
policies as well as in policies for voyage."); Jones v. Insurance Co., 13 F. Cas.
982 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1852) (No. 7,470).
150. See Hoxie v. Home Ins. Co, 32 Conn. 21, 37 (1864), overruled as stated in
Kilduffv. Adams, Inc., 593 A.2d 478 (Conn. 1991).
151. See Merchants Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 62 Ill. 242 (1871).
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was accepted by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1888 with Union
Insurance Co. v. Smith."' The Court used the following lan-
guage:
In the insurance of a vessel by a time policy, the warranty
of seaworthiness is complied with if the vessel be seawor-
thy at the commencement of the risk, and the fact that she
subsequently sustains damage, and is not properly refitted
at an intermediate port, does not discharge the insurer
from subsequent risk or loss, provided such loss be not the
consequence of the omission. A defect of seaworthiness,
arising after the commencement of the risk, and permitted
to continue from bad faith or want of ordinary prudence or
diligence on the part of the insured or his agents, dis-
charges the insurer from liability for any loss which is the
consequence of such bad faith, or want of prudence or dili-
gence; but does not affect the contract of insurance as to
any other risk or loss covered by the policy and not caused
or increased by such particular defect.153
Union Insurance Co. therefore marked the beginnings of
the growing chasm between English law, which did not rec-
ognize an implied warranty in all time policies, and American
insurance law, which did.
Twentieth century jurisprudence saw an attempt to limit
the inequitable result of insurers escaping liability for a loss
caused by the insured's negligence."' The case law seems
driven more by courts' desire to achieve international uni-
formity rather than by their desire to formulate a uniquely
American formula, an ideal that could be described as a com-
mercially reasonable principle."' Two 1927 cases from the
Second Circuit confused the issue however. The first case,
New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co. v. Gray, 56 ig-
nored both elements of the Union Insurance Co. rule."7 How-
ever, this same Second Circuit court held later that year that
152. Union Ins. Co. v. Smith, 124 U.S. 405 (1888).
153. Id. at 427.
154. See New York & P.R.S.S. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 204 F. 255 (2d Cir. 1913).
155. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 340 U.S. 54 (1950); Aetna
Ins. Co. v. United Fruit Co., 304 U.S. 430 (1938); Queen Ins. Co. v. Globe &
Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 263 U.S. 487 (1924); Allen N. Spooner & Son Inc. v. Con-
necticut Fire Ins. Co., 314 F.2d 753 (2d Cir. 1963); Gregoire v. Underwriters at
Lloyd's, 599 F. Supp. 596 (D. Alaska 1982).
156. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co. v. Gray, 240 F.2d 460 (2d
Cir. 1957).
157. See id. at 466.
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a covenant of seaworthiness is implied in every hull insur-
ance policy.'58 The American Rule was gradually narrowed to
a rule in which the implied warranty was limited to cases
where the vessel was in port at the time of attachment,
making it more closely aligned with the British rule, but dis-
tinctive nonetheless. 9
The shipowner's obligation under an American time hull
policy at the inception of the risk is simple: the vessel must be
seaworthy at the attachment of the insurance or at the incep-
tion of the risk.' As stated by the court in Gulfstream Cargo,
Ltd. v. Reliance Insurance Co.,161 there is an implied condi-
tion, at the commencement of the risk, that the vessel is ca-
pable of navigation; safe at sea and in port; and seaworthy
when she first sails, or has sailed seaworthy and is safe if in
port. Thereafter, the seaworthiness obligation is a negative
warranty under which the owner or those in privity with him
must not (1) fail to exercise due diligence, or (2) send the ves-
sel to sea in a deficient condition.' There are therefore two
warranties under the American rule. First, an inception war-
ranty that the vessel is seaworthy at the time of the policy's
inception. Second, a correlative "negative" warranty, which
requires that the owner, from bad faith or neglect, will not
knowingly permit the vessel to break ground'63 in an unsea-
worthy condition. 64 Thus, an insured has a continuing duty
during the term of the policy to exercise due diligence to
158. See McAllister Lighterage Line, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 244
F.2d (2d Cir. 1957).
159. See Henjes v. Aetna Ins. Co., 132 F. 2d 715 (2d Cir. 1943); Zillah Transp.
Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 221 N.W. 529 (Minn. 1928); see also Gibson v. Small 10
Eng. Rep. 353 (H.L. 1853) (stating the British version of this rule).
160. See Brice, supra note 93, at 110; see also Gulfstream Cargo, Ltd. v. Reli-
ance Ins. Co., 409 F.2d 974, 983 (5th Cir. 1969); Lemar Towing Inc. v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., 352 F. Supp. 652, 660 (E.D. La. 1972).
161. Gulfstream Cargo, 409 F.2d at 974.
162. See Austin v. Servac Shipping Line, 610 F. Supp. 229 (E.D. Tex. 1985).
163. See Continental Ins. Co. v. Lone Eagle Shipping, 952 F. Supp. 1046
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). The Continental Insurance court held the vessel owners did
not breach the negative implied warranty of seaworthiness, even though they
had learned of a breach in integrity of the hull, because the vessel was not in
port but was merely in the roads when it was allowed to continue on its voyage
on the open sea. The vessel did not break ground when it left the roads, as op-
posed to situations in which an unseaworthy vessel leaves port. See id.
164. See Kilpatrick Marine Piling v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 795 F.2d. 940
(11th Cir. 1986); Gulfstream Cargo, Ltd. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 409 F.2d 974 (5th
Cir. 1969). See also PARKS, supra note 4, at 266.
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maintain the vessel in a seaworthy condition, but is not under
a duty to maintain absolute seaworthiness under all condi-
tions.
A defense to breach of the seaworthiness warranty under
the American Rule exists when the owner did not act with
"bad faith" or "knowing neglect."'65 To find a breach of the
negative implied warranty of seaworthiness, the court must
find that the insured, the owner of the vessel,166 had "knowl-
edge" of the unseaworthy condition of the vessel.'67 Some
courts equate the due diligence requirement with negli-
gence.168 One court, however, held that due diligence requires
only subjectively sufficient actions, even if the conduct is ob-
jectively negligent, as long as the conduct is not reckless. 9
The standard of due diligence emerged as another key differ-
ence between U.S. and British law on the warranty. What
amounts to "due diligence" may be different under English or
United States law. In the United States, to defeat the in-
sured's claim that it was diligent, the insurer may also have
to show that the insured was negligent in not discovering the
unseaworthy condition."' Under English law, and the equi-
table exception described above, a showing of actual knowl-
165. See generally Derek P. Langhauser, Implied Warranties of Seaworthi-
ness: Applying the Knowing Neglect Standard in Time Hull Insurance Policies,
39 ME. L. REV. 443 (1987).
166. The knowledge of the master will not be imputed to the owner. See Tex-
aco v. Universal Marine, 400 F. Supp. 311 (E.D. La. 1975); see also Lemar
Towing Co., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co, 352 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. La. 1972).
167. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Board of Commr's, 733 F.2d 1161 (5th
Cir. 1984). In Board of Commr's, the court held that the vessel owner did not
exercise due diligence to maintain its vessel in a seaworthy condition as re-
quired by hull policy, and therefore there was no coverage for collision. This
was held despite contention that the owner was unaware that its licensed cap-
tain, assigned to the tug on the date of casualty, had gone ashore after com-
pleting his 12-hour watch, and for two thirds of the time the vessel was com-
manded by an unlicensed captain. See id; see also Continental Ins. Co. v. Lone
Eagle Shipping Ltd., 952 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Lemar Towing, 352 F.
Supp. at 652.
168. See L & L Marine Serv., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 796 F.2d 1032
(8th Cir. 1986); Jefferson Marine Towing, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, Lon-
don, 472 So. 2d 146 (La. App. 1985).
169. See Windsor Mount Joy Mut. Ins. Co. v. Giragosian, 864 F. Supp. 239
(D. Mass. 1994) (holding that due diligence required of an insured under the
seaworthiness warranty was satisfied by conduct subjectively believed by in-
sured to be adequate, even though insured negligently sailed while boat was in
an unseaworthy condition).
170. See L & L Marine Service, 796 F.2d at 1032; Gregoire v. Underwriters at
Lloyd's, London, 559 F. Supp. 596 (D. Alaska 1982).
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edge of the unseaworthiness may be required. Some courts,
however, remain uncertain as to whether the negli-
gence/actual knowledge distinction is a valid one. 1
In order to absolve the insurer, the breach of the negative
warranty must be the proximate cause of the loss under the
American Rule. 2 To determine proximate cause in maritime
insurance cases courts look to the predominant, determining,
or real efficient cause of the loss. Proximate cause is not de-
termined by "but for" causation, therefore making it a stricter
analysis than in some negligence cases."'
If the warranty of seaworthiness at the inception of the
voyage is breached, the breach voids the policy if the
shipowner had prior knowledge of the unseaworthy condi-
tion.7 4 By contrast, knowingly permitting the vessel to break
ground in an unseaworthy condition denies liability only for
loss or damage proximately caused by the unseaworthiness. 75
Such a breach does not, therefore, void the entire policy, but
only serves to exonerate the underwriter for loss or damage
proximately caused by the unseaworthy condition. 6 The ves-
sel need not continue to be absolutely seaworthy, but the in-
surer will not be liable for any loss attributable to unseawor-
thiness to which the insured was privy. 7
The American Rule is "not so well established as its name
implies" and "the great majority of the decided cases in this
country are consistent with the English Rule." 78 It should
171. See Tropical Marine Prods., Inc. v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co., 247 F.2d
116 (5th Cir. 1957) (holding that knowledge of patent defect is not required).
172. Under California law, unseaworthiness does not give the insurer a com-
plete defense, regardless of proximate cause. See Rosa v. Insurance Co. of Pa.,
296 F. Supp. 167 (S.D. Cal. 1969); see also CAL. INS. CODE § 1920 (Deering
1997).
173. Continental Ins. Co. v. Lone Eagle Shipping, 952 F. Supp. 1046
(S.D.N.Y. 1997), affd, 134 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 1998). Like seaworthiness, deter-
mination of proximate cause in marine insurance cases has been deemed "sol-
idly entrenched." See Beer, supra note 30, at 161.
174. See Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 978 F.2d
1422, 1431-32 (5th Cir. 1993).
175. See Lloyd's U.S. Corp. v. Smallwood, 719 F. Supp. 1540 (M.D. Fla. 1989);
Jefferson Marine Towing, Inc. v. Underwriter's at Lloyd's London, 472 So. 2d
146 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
176. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Board of Comm'rs, 733 F.2d 1161, 1166
(5th Cir. 1984); Lemar Towing Co v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 352 F. Supp. 652,
660 (E.D. La. 1972).
177. See Saskatchewan Gov't Ins. Office v. Spot Pack, Inc., 242 F.2d 385 (5th
Cir. 1957).
178. Russel W. Pritchett, The Implied Warranty of Seaworthiness in Time
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therefore be hesitantly applied. Courts, however, cite the
following rationale behind applying the warranty in time
policies, "the sound reasons supporting an absolute, implied
warranty of seaworthiness at the inception of a voyage policy
also support such a warranty in the context of a time policy-
at least where the ship is in a port of repair at the time the
policy attaches."'79 Courts cite the superior knowledge of the
insured and requirement of knowledge of unseaworthiness as
reasons to apply a continuing warranty of seaworthiness,
rather than a warranty at the inception of the risk, as under
English law. Applying the American Rule also strongly fa-
vors underwriters. 80 Given the longstanding and ongoing
confusion surrounding the mechanics of the warranty in time
policies, courts should harmonize the "American Rule" with
the English law, which implies no such warranty under these
circumstances.
F. Relation to Limitation of Liability
There is an important connection between seaworthiness
and limitation of liability. The Shipowner's Limitation of Li-
ability Act ("LLA") allows a shipowner to limit liability for
any collision or other damage caused by his vessel to his in-
terest in the vessel.' The LLA prohibits the limitation of li-
ability if the vessel was unseaworthy at the time of injury and
unseaworthiness was a cause of the injury."'
Under the LLA, claimants, or opponents to limitation,
have the initial burden of proving the negligence or unsea-
worthiness of the vessel. After establishing unseaworthiness,
the burden shifts to the vessel's owner, who is seeking limita-
tion, to prove that the unseaworthiness did not contribute to
the collision and was not within his privity or knowledge."8 '
Policies: the American View, 1983 LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L. 195 (1983).
179. Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 978 F.2d
1422, 1436 (5th Cir. 1993).
180. See DONALD O'MAY, MARINE INSURANCE LAW & POLICY 89 (1993).
181. See 46 U.S.C.A. app. § 183 (West 1958 & Supp. 1999).
182. See id. §§ 190, 191.
183. See Brister v. A.W.I. Inc., 946 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1991); In re Sause Bros.
Ocean Towing, 769 F. Supp. 1147 (D. Or. 1991); In re Texaco, Inc., 570 F. Supp.
1272 (E.D. La. 1983); see also Illinois Constructors Corp. v. Logan Transp., 715
F. Supp. 872 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (limiting liability to the value of the vessel where
shipowner provided a seaworthy vessel and a competent crew and where the
navigational errors of pilot, which were sole proximate cause of collision, were
not within privity or knowledge of owner).
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The court must determine which act of negligence or condi-
tions of unseaworthiness caused the damage, then evaluate
whether the shipowner had knowledge or privity of those spe-
cific acts or conditions.' Therefore, finding knowledge of an
unseaworthy condition prohibits limitation, thereby exposing
the shipowner to extensive liability in the absence of liability
insurance coverage.
IV. CLAIMS FOR PERSONAL INJURY
Obviously, unseaworthiness not only causes damage to
vessels and their cargo, but can also cause injuries to persons.
In cases of personal injury, seaworthiness becomes a cause of
action, rather than a primarily insurance-related considera-
tion. Unique and contrasting principles apply for injuries to
seamen, crew members, and third parties, especially when
discussing differences between British and U.S. law. British
law, for example, makes no distinction between maritime and
non-maritime claims for personal injury or death. Perhaps
even more startling to the American lawyer is that liability
for a seaman's personal injury under British law is fault
based-absolute liability does not exist.'85 Although a mari-
time employer owes a duty to his employees to exercise rea-
sonable care in maintaining a seaworthy vessel, seaworthi-
ness is not an absolute obligation in the British system.
Furthermore, damages are assessed by a judge rather than by
a jury.186
Overall, United States law is far more generous to its
184. See In re Ta Chi Navigation Corp., S.A., 513 F. Supp. 148, 160 (E.D. La.
1981). The owner cannot, however, claim that his lack of knowledge was caused
by a delegation of his duties, given the non-delegable nature of the duty to pro-
vide a seaworthy vessel. See In re Ocean Foods Boat Co., 692 F. Supp. 1253 (D.
Or. 1988). In Ocean Foods Boat Co., the owner of a ship involved in a collision
that was partly the result of the negligence of crew members, could not limit its
liability on the ground that it had delegated hiring of the crew to a competent
master because there was opportunity for day-to-day consultation between the
master and owner. The owner established no procedures for hiring replacement
crew members, and master was never told that he was to hire competent crew.
See id.; see also In re Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 813 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding
that second mate's failure to call captain, along with his failure to comply with
proper steering procedures, constituted a mistake of navigation to which owner
of vessel was not deemed in privity for purpose of allowing shipowner to limit its
liability to value of vessel and her freight).
185. See Lord Donaldson of Lymington, Sources of Recovery for Maritime Per-
sonal Injury and Death under British Law, 68 TUL. L. REV. 367 (1994).
186. See id. at 371.
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seamen in terms of remedies for unseaworthiness causing
personal injury. In addition to statutory enactments, U.S.
common law fashioned a "general maritime law" cause of ac-
tion for a seaman's injuries caused by unseaworthiness.
A. General Maritime Law Remedy for Unseaworthiness
The maritime common law cause of action for unseawor-
thiness has long appealed to injured seamen.
The admiralty doctrine of absolute liability for unseawor-
thiness is based on protection of seamen who sign articles
for a voyage and are then under the absolute control of a
master with power to order seamen to do the ship's work
in any weather, under any conditions, using such equip-
ment as may be furnished by the shipowner.
187
Under the general maritime principles of seaworthiness,
an owner, pro hac vice or otherwise, owes to seamen an abso-
lute duty to "furnish a ship, crew, and appurtenances rea-
sonably fit for their intended service, i.e., a duty to provide a
seaworthy vessel."'88  This absolute duty does not extend to
passengers, invitees, or guests, who are relegated to a negli-
gence cause of action.'89 An owner's failure to provide a sea-
worthy vessel results in strict liability, without regard to
negligence or notice, in which the vessel may be liable in rem,
and the owner personally liable, for personal injuries to sea-
187. Offshore Co. v. Robinson, 266 F.2d 769, 781 (5th Cir. 1959); see also
Powell v. F.J. O'Hara & Sons, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 377 (D. Me. 1976).
188. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 549 (1960); see also Lie-
berman v. Matson Navigation Co., 300 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1962); Tanzi v. Deut-
sche Dampfschiffahrts-Gesellscharft Hansa v. International Terminal Operat-
ing Co., Inc., 355 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Alvez v. American Export
Isbrandtsen Lines, 434 N.Y.S.2d 384 (App. Div. 1980).
189. See Kermarec v. Companie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625
(1959); Kornberg v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 741 F.2d 1332 (11th. Cir. 1984)
(holding that shipowner's disclaimer of the warranty of seaworthiness could not
reasonably be interpreted as waiving its duty to provide adequate accommoda-
tions to its passengers inasmuch as the doctrine of seaworthiness does not apply
to passengers); Gibboney v. Wright, 517 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that
shipowner owed passengers a duty to exercise reasonable care); Griffith v.
Martech Int'l, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 166, 169 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that the duty
of a shipowner to furnish a seaworthy vessel extends only to seamen and not to
passengers, visitors, or other persons aboard vessel who are instead owned only
duty of due care, a negligence standard); Armour v. Gradler, 448 F. Supp. 741
(D. Pa. 1978) (holding that since guest was not aboard vessel to perform tradi-
tional duties assigned to one in a ship's employ, he was not a "seaman" to whom
doctrine of seaworthiness extended, and thus is owed duty of reasonable care).
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men. 190
A ship operator only owes a duty under the general mari-
time law to seamen employed as crew. A crewmember means
a seaman having a substantial relation to the ship in terms of
duration of shipboard employment. One who "does the work
of a seamen," or a seaman pro hac vice, is entitled to seawor-
thiness as a remedy. "The critical question is whether ...
[the plaintiff] was doing the work of a seaman aboard the
barge. If he was, he is entitled to sue on the warranty of sea-
worthiness; if not, his suit must be dismissed."'91 Pilots, for
example, are not entitled to the seaworthiness remedy, pri-
marily because they lack the requisite attachment to the ves-
sel. 1
9 2
B. Jones Act
The Jones Act protects the American seaman from un-
seaworthy conditions. Enacted in 1920, the Jones Act pro-
vides a statutory cause of action for the injury or death of a
seaman caused by negligence, 9 ' a cause of action not allowed
under traditional general maritime law.'
A cause of action under the Jones Act is distinct from a
claim under the common law maritime unseaworthiness doc-
trine: "the concept of liability to a seaman injured aboard a
190. See CHARLES M. DAVIS, MARITIME LAW DESKBOOK 145 (1997).
191. Browing v. B.F. Diamond Construction Co., Inc., 289 S.E.2d 268, 270
(Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (quoting Lewis v. Roland E. Trego & Sons, 501 F.2d 372,
374 (4th Cir. 1974)); see also Savard v. Marine Contracting, Inc., 471 F.2d 536
(2d Cir. 1972); Turner v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 748 F. Supp. 80
(W.D.N.Y. 1990); Cwick v. Rochester, 107 A.D.2d 1074 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
192. See Harwood v. Partredereit AF 15.5.81, 944 F.2d 1187 (4th Cir. 1991)
(holding that harbor pilot who was not "more or less permanently attached" to
vessel was not a seaman for purposes of Jones Act); Bach v. Trident Shipping
Co., Inc., 708 F. Supp. 772 (E.D. La. 1988) (holding that pilot acting as an inde-
pendent contractor through pilots' association which assigned him to vessel was
not a Jones Act seaman because there was no employer-employee relationship
between him and vessel's operator); Clark v. Solomon Navigation Co., 631 F.
Supp. 1275 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that independent river pilot was not cov-
ered by Jones Act).
193. The Jones act provided:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his em-
ployment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law,
with the right of trial by jury.., and in case of the death of any sea-
man as a result of any such personal injury the personal representative
of such seaman may maintain an action for damages at law.
46 U.S.C.A. app. § 688 (West 1975).
194. See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354 (1995).
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ship as a result of negligence by the vessel is completely dif-
ferent from liability as a result of unseaworthiness." 9' "Lack
of seaworthiness results in liability without fault while li-
ability in the former case depends on failure of the vessel or
owner to exercise reasonable care."'96 In unseaworthiness
causes of action, how the unseaworthy condition developed,
whether by negligence or otherwise, is irrelevant to the
shipowner's liability for personal injuries resulting there-
from. 9' "Since the inquiry in unseaworthiness cases is not di-
rected to the issue of the owner's fault, it follows that prior
notice, actual or constructive, of the unseaworthy condition is
not essential to a cause of action based on that doctrine.'9 8 A
seaman may join a claim for unseaworthiness under general
maritime law with a claim under the Jones Act for negli-
gence, where the actions resulting in unseaworthiness were
the result of negligence rather than mere accident.'99 With
regard to wrongful death, the Jones Act provision creating a
negligence cause of action against a seaman's employer is
preclusive only of state remedies for death from unseaworthi-
ness and does not preempt general maritime wrongful death
actions. 00
The dual nature of the remedial scheme was first ad-
dressed in Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc.2°' In Mitchell, the
Court held that "the decisions of this Court have undeviat-
ingly reflected an understanding that the owner's duty to fur-
nish a seaworthy ship is absolute and completely independent
of his duty under the Jones Act to exercise reasonable care."2 '
The Court also noted that case law evolved into "a complete
divorcement of unseaworthiness liability from concepts of
negligence. '"2' 3 The standard for proximate cause is higher in
unseaworthiness cases. In an unseaworthiness case, "a plain-
tiff must prove that the unseaworthy condition played a sub-
stantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury
195. Slaughter v. S.S. Ronde, 390 F. Supp. 637, 640 (S.D. Ga. 1974).
196. Id. at 640-41.
197. See id. at 641.
198. Poignant v. United States, 225 F.2d 595, 597 (2d Cir. 1955).
199. See Ivy v. Security Barge Lines, Inc., 606 F.2d 524, 528-29 (5th Cir.
1979).
200. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 34 (1990).
201. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960).
202. Id. at 549.
203. Id. at 550.
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and that the injury was either a direct result or a reasonably
probable consequence of the unseaworthiness. ''2°4 With re
spect to available remedies against the vessel in rem or the
operator in personam, the seaman may recover loss of income,
medical expenses, pain and suffering, and compensation for
disability, under both the Jones Act and a general maritime
unseaworthiness cause of action."'
C. Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
In 1946, the Supreme Court decision of Seas Shipping
Co. v. Sieracki2°6 extended to maritime workers the right to
recover from the vessel owner under a theory of unseaworthi-
ness. °7 This recovery was previously available only to sea-
men. In Sieracki, the Court held that a longshoreman, for all
practical purposes, is a seaman "because he is doing a sea-
man's work and incurring a seaman's hazards, [and, a]s such,
he [is] entitled to a seaman's warranty of seaworthiness."20
To recover under the unseaworthiness doctrine of Sieracki, a
longshoreman need only prove an unsafe, injury-causing con-
dition on board the vessel.0 9
The1972 amendments to the Longshore and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA") eliminated this strict
liability remedy. 10 Pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 905(b), tort li-
204. Johnson v. Offshore Express, Inc., 845 F.2d 1347, 1354 (5th Cir. 1988).
205. See generally Arthur J. Mandell and Herman Wright, Seamen's Injuries,
in 9 AM. JUR. Trials 665 (1965). See also Bush v. Diamond Offshore Co., 46 F.
Supp. 2d. 515 (E.D. La. 1999); Alexie v. Columbia Coastal Transp., Inc., No.
CIV.A.97-0052, 1997 WL 313414, at *1 (E.D. La. June 9, 1997); Trident Marine,
Inc. v. M/V Atticos, 876 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. La. 1994); Viator v. Liverpool & Lon-
don S.S. Protection & Indem. Ass'n, 701 So. 2d 487 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
206. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
207. See id. at 95.
208. Rodney A. Seydel, Jr., Status of the Sieracki-Seaman after the 1972
Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 57
TUL. L. REV. 379, 382 (1982).
209. See id.
210. The Longshore and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act states:
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by
the negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise enti-
tled to recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action against
such vessel as a third party in accordance with the provisions of section
933 of this title, and the employer shall not be liable to the vessel for
such damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties
to the contrary shall be void.... If such person was employed by the
vessel to provide ship building or repair services, no such action shall
be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons en-
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ability of a vessel to a person covered by the LHWCA "cannot
be based upon the warranty of seaworthiness or a breach
thereof."21' This statutory withdrawal of the warranty of sea-
worthiness from longshore and harbor workers was deemed
constitutional by at least one federal court. 12  Despite the
LHWCA amendments, longshore workers may qualify as
seamen pro hac vice, depending on their duties, and could
therefore pursue the remedy available under general mari-
time law.
D. Wrongful Death: Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA)
and Other Remedies
The warranty of seaworthiness does not extend to pas-
sengers on vessels. Passengers are entitled to voyage on a
vessel properly equipped to handle reasonable conditions and
accomplish the purpose of the voyage.213 While not entitled to
strict liability protections, some third parties (including ves-
sel passengers) may be entitled to a higher duty of care based
on traditional tort principles.
Section 761 of the Death on High Seas Act ("DOHSA")214
provides for a cause of action for death resulting from unsea-
gaged in providing ship building or repair services to the vessel. The
liability of the vessel under this subsection shall not be based upon the
warranty of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time the injury oc-
curred. The remedy provided in this subsection shall be exclusive of all
other remedies against the vessel except remedies available under this
chapter.
33 U.S.C.A. § 905(b) (West 1976) (emphasis added).
211. Slaughter v. S.S. Ronde Fyffes Group, 509 F.2d 973, 974 n.1 (5th Cir.
1975).
212. See Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237 (3d Cir. 1977); Lucas v.
"Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges. Franz Lange G.m.B.H. & Co., KG., 387 F. Supp. 440
(E.D. Pa. 1974).
213. See In re Catalina Cruises, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 1384, 1393 (C.D. Cal.
1996).
214. The Death on High Seas Act states:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, ne-
glect or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from
the shore of any State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or
dependencies of the United States, the personal representative of the
decedent may maintain a suit for damages in the district courts of the
United States, in admiralty, for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's
wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative against the vessel,
person, or corporation which would have been liable if death had not
ensued.
46 U.S.C.A. app. § 761 (West 1975).
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worthiness of a vessel. DOHSA provides a remedy in admi-
ralty for the death of any person caused by wrongful act, ne-
glect, or default, including the breach of warranty of seawor-
thiness.21 However, the standard of care owed is different
depending on the status of the decedent. While the warranty
of seaworthiness under DOHSA imposes on the shipowner
the absolute duty to provide a seaman with a seaworthy ves-
sel and equipment reasonably fit for its intended use on the
vessel, it only requires that non-seamen third persons not be
negligently put at risk."6 The survivor of a seaman may thus
bring a claim for wrongful death under DOHSA for a death
caused by unseaworthiness predicated on strict liability.217
However, as applied to passengers on a vessel, or other non-
seaman third parties, the duty is based on negligence rather
than strict liability. 18
In addition to these federal statutory causes of action,
state law remedies for wrongful deaths within territorial wa-
ters may also be available.219 In Yamaha Motor Corporation
U.S.A. v. Calhoun,"' the Supreme Court decided that non-
seafarers, meaning those not covered by the Jones Act or
LHWCA, are entitled to state law remedies for wrongful
death occurring within territorial waters. Yamaha Motor re-
versed an earlier trend of displacing state tort law remedies
in favor of the "federal maritime cause of action." '' An indi-
215. See In re Industrial Transp. Corp., 344 F. Supp. 1311, 1319 (E.D.N.Y.
1972).
216. See Soileau v. Niclos Drilling Co., 302 F. Supp. 119, 126 (W.D. La. 1969);
Doyle v. Albatross Tanker Corp., 260 F. Supp. 303, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
217. See Chermesio v. Vessel Judith Lee Rose, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 36, 39 (D.
Mass. 1962) (holding that DOHSA gives a remedy for breach of warranty of
seaworthiness, and that a libelant may recover thereunder without proof of
negligence or culpability); see also Trident Marine, Inc. v. M/V Atticos, 876 F.
Supp. 832, 833 (E.D. La. 1994) (stating that the four four basic theories upon
which a seaman may base a claim for recovery when suffering a personal injury
or wrongful death are (1) a Jones Act negligence cause of action, (2) a DOHSA
claim, (3) a general maritime law action for unseaworthiness of the ship, and (4)
a general maritime law action for negligence).
218. See In re Dearborn Marine Serv., Inc., 499 F.2d 263, 277 (5th Cir. 1974)
("Maritime duty of a shipowner to ... a nonseaman 'on board for purposes not
inimical to the legitimate interests [of the shipowner],' is not one of furnishing a
seaworthy hull and appliances without regard to fault, but one of 'exercising
reasonable care under the circumstances."' (quoting Kermarec v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959))).
219. See Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 206.
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vidual may therefore have recourse to state law remedies for
deaths occurring within "all inland waters, all water between
[the] line of mean high tide and [the] line of ordinary low wa-
ter, and all waters seaward to a line three geographical miles
distant from the coast line." '222 This obviously encompasses
deaths caused by unseaworthiness.
The United States should align itself with the British
model only insofar as lessening distinctions between seamen,
other maritime workers, and third parties in cases of injuries
or death caused by unseaworthiness. While the absolute
standard owed to seamen should not be extended to all, "non-
maritime" third parties should be owed a higher standard of
care than is currently required of vessel operators given the
discrepancy in knowledge and experience.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The importance of the seaworthiness doctrine cannot be
understated. An understanding of its principles is fundamen-
tal, whether engaged in the practice of maritime personal in-
jury or commercial shipping. The doctrine's evolution has,
however, been painstaking in many ways. Despite the appar-
ent good intentions of the courts, disharmony and inconsis-
tency result in a simple concept being at times maze-like in
its intricacy. With respect to carriage of goods and marine in-
surance, the courts should look to the Marine Insurance Act
for guidance in application of the warranty, and thereby har-
monize U.S. law with British principles. The first step in this
endeavor would be a judicial abolition of the much-maligned
"American Rule." Addition of an American Marine Insurance
Act codifying a harmonized law would remove the clouds of
ambiguity from this and other marine insurance principles.
Similarly, U.S. law should emulate the British law on
personal injury arising from unseaworthiness. Rather than
perpetuating a strict liability standard for seamen, a "higher
duty" negligence remedy should be extended to all seamen,
harbor workers, and third parties injured by unseaworthi-
ness. In addition to ending the bountiful litigation sur-
rounding the definition of seamen, at least in unseaworthi-
ness cases, this all-encompassing standard would protect all
222. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1473 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "territorial wa-
ters").
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persons exposed to unseaworthiness who may not be pro-
tected by statutory enactments. Overall, much work is
needed before the seaworthiness doctrine becomes a homoge-
nous principle, which practitioners can easily and consis-
tently apply.
